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Abstract. ('lub efficient allocations ar~ the ones that remain in the core of a replicatE~d econ-
omp. Schweizcr's price support theorem unifies not only the welfare and core limit t.heorems
for private~ good economies, and the Henry George Theorem for economies with fixe~d pubGr
goods, but also encotnpasses Vasil'ev's core limit theorem for economies with congested public
goods. This is shown hy a,ppropriate choice~ of aggregation rule defining local public goods and
bc proof of a theorem acrording to whinc ~lub ef~icienc}' implies Lindahl equilibrium.
JF,L ~~odes: 11.11, R.il, D71
~ot~~. Feedhack by Marcus lierliant, Robert Gilles, Jean Jacqut's Ilerings, Yieter Ruys,
l;rs Schweizer, Dolf 'Calman ancí nTyrna l~'oodcrs is grati~Eully~ acknowledged. "I'his ver-
vion i, preliniittar~~.1 Introduction
I'his p~per is ahout public goods and tiie conipetitive basis for equilibrium E~rices. "The
story is well known for economi~s ~cith pricate goorls only. 'I'he~~ ad~nit ~~~~a,lrasian equi-
libria and those are the onl}~ allocation that cannot br irn~~ro~~od upon hc coalitions of
agents when t.be economy is laige. [Icre lar~;~ncss is modeled by replication oi' agents or
by admitt.ing clubs of dif'Ferent types oí agents with the agents entering in Cree nurnbers.
Allocations that eannot bc~ impro~-c~d upon "remain in the core~" or, equicalentl~~. "are
club efFicient."
With pure public goods there is a problem. Such iterns are not replic:ated along with
t.he rest of thF economy~. 'I`he resources foregone iu th~~ir provision are independ~~nt uf
the size of a club. l;tility le~~els can therefore he incrcased by adrnittiug new me~nbers
and spreading ~he burd~~n of the puhlic good. Schw~eizer (19~33) provides price support
of a club efficient allocation in an econorny w~ith public guods, but musl assumc tbat
som~~ agents cir endowment.s are given iu (ixed numbers. The variabli~ agents can c~scape
taxa.tion bv the above logic a.nd a,re, t.herefore, Free riders. The use uf thc exogcnous clnh
eu~lewment for the funding of the public gonrlv aniounts to thP Henry George Thcorein.
If therc arc no fixed numbers, there still is the Lindahl eyuilibrium. Its competitivc
basis is meager, however. for it is just~ one oC ma,ny allocations of economies with pure
public goods tJiat remain in the core or are club efficient (blilleron, 1971). i~Iy perspectivc
on public goods and local public goods is that oI aggrega~,ion. Privatc goods ancl pure
public goods are just polar cases; indicidual demands are aggregated by sumrnation and
maximization. respectively. In t,his paper I propose an intermediatc nature of goods.
1~lember demands are aggregated like public goods, but the consequcnt public goods ~et
replic~ted along with the rest of the economy. I coin them local puhlic ~oods.
'The mtiult of this paper extends price support of club efficient allocations to ecouomic~s
witli local public goods. For such economies, a club efficient allocation is in fact a Lindahl
equilibriiun.
2 The model
Any given population can be represcnted by ~ list of consumer tvpcs, t- 1,...,"T, and
a vector of niunbers of consumers for each type, no E R~. Replicat,ion is carried out by
means of a club. A club n E Rt comprises n` members of type t- A club is the replicat ion
de~-ice; the population remains a fïxed no, sucb as (1,..., I). Consider for each type t
indi~~iríual dcmands for goods, ,y` E~~, the ~~ommodity space. Club demand ~rnounts~~n~y' if the goods are private an~1 max y` if the goods are purely public. 5iunmat ions
and ~naximizat,ions are ocer t- 1....,"I'. Thi~ rnaximum o~~er a number of ~-ectors is
dcfined coinponent by component. ('lub deniand amounts (inaxra`)(~naxy`~ if the goocls
are locally public.
For a first understanding, consider a scalar rcplicate, rz -(r,...,r), of an econoiny~
with population iao -(1, ... , 1), bnt no excessive consnrner (demanding rnore of a public
good than anyone else). The elimination of an individual de~mand, be it by putt.ing
either ~y~ or n.` eqnal to zero. cloes not rediice club dcmand for the local public good. 1'et
club demand gets replicated with the size o[ the economy, max n~. Notic~e that there are
constaut returns of scale o( local public good provision with res~ect to scalar replication.
The size of a club cloes not tnatter, but its cornposition is crucial.
Since si~~e is rneasured by max n~, loral public goods favour mixed populat.ions, such
as (1, ..., 1). [f the size of the eronom}~ were measure~d by~ ~ a` insteací, separat ion
by type would occur. I'or example, if ~~ -(1 0), y~~ -(0 1), no -(1 1), then
~ r~.i~ ~naxy~ -(2 2). ~ow ronsider n-(1 0) ancí n-(0 1) separately. Club demands
H-ould be (1 0) and (0 1), summing to (1 1) only. In other wr,rrls, mixing I~he clubs is
nneconomical when size is ineasured by ~ n~. This lack of convexity would iuvalidate
}~rice support oi club efficient allocations.
('r,nsinner l has initial endoreinent ce` E Rt, net trade c~ E Rt, prirate consuntption
.x~~ w~ E li~, and (local) public consurnption y` E á~. There a.re n` E Rt of consumers
of type t member of a club. an allocotioia (.rt,y~,~a')i-~,...,T is jea~ible if
y, ~n~.r~ -~ rnax n~ rnax y~ c 0.
NeC ilernands for the private and public goods sum to zero at n~ost. For simplicity, there
is no production. l,ocal public goods are obtained by setting privaie goods aside. The
local public goods sector has as inpnt con~imodity~ vector inax ~a` max y` and as outE~iut-
s inclicidual demands for public goods, ?~~,...,~~~. Ynblic goods production coald be
modeled by letting comrnodity input niaxn~ maxyi be t.he output of a production pro-
cess. NoLice- however, that this would be covered by ihe introdiiction of a production
possihility set for thc private goods, ra-hich is a straightforwarcl extension oC the model.
[ndeed, (local) public goods are special by the consumption rather than the production
tec'linology.
Consumer t has a utilit,y function U~ over his priva,te and public consumption. ílow-
ever, since his inítia] endowment is fixed, I write (~`~(r`, y'). Consider feasible allocations
(,z`,,y', n')~-~,.,.T and (ro, ~~„ no)~-~,..,,T. The former is a club improvc~ent over the latterif
L"(.r~, y~) ~ í ~~(au, yo~
for all t- 1,...,T. (Note that this dFfinit.ion anticipates strong monotonicity of ut.iliti-
w~hich will be assunied in t.lic~ ni~zt section iodeed.) If no such club iinpro~.ement exists,
alloc~~tiuu (a~~, yó,nu)~-i,....r is called clvb r(jïrien.l, following Sch~ceize~r (198:}).
r1 feasible allocation (r~,yi„n~~)~-i,...,~~ is a Ii~e~tnlcl r.q~ur~liórivem if price vectors
p, p~ ,..., p~ ~ Iltt exist with
Í~ó, ~o) - argm~x U~(ar~, yi~ tiub.j~~c'1. to p.t` -~ p`y~ G 0
E7zoP~?ló - a~ max iai~ rnax yó
(yu. ...,;qo, rro) - argiuax En`p~i~~ - p max vi~ max y~).
}3y tlie first conditiori, consumers maxi[nize ut.ility given thc market prices for the~ privaLe
goods and t~h~ personal feeti for lhe local public goods. Tlte fees cover the coals iif
provisiun by the second condiLiou. The third con~lition is uot al~n-ays included: the public
administrat~iori is in charge o[ th~~ provisiori and admission policie,, as to ~naxirnize E~rofit.
(Prof~it, is zeco by the second coiidi~,io~a.)
3 The theorein
Little iti assunied. Followin~ Schweizer (L983), positivity of prices is ensured t.o render a
yuasi-cquilibrium eyuilibrium.
Assun~tption. I~:ach consumer has positive initia.l endowment of at Ieast, some com~nocli-
ty, i.e. u!~ ~ 0. Club n~~ -(r~.ó.. .., reó) has strictly posiLive endowrncuL, i.e. ~ rz~w' ~1 0.
Utility G`' is continuous, quasi-conc~ce, ~and strongly monotonic.
In Ihe context of this assumption we have the following result,.
T}teorem. A club efficient allocation is a Linda.hl equilibriurn.Proof. Lct (zo,y~, rr~)~-t,....~ ~e club eíficient. De(ine ih~~ follo~cing subsets of 1H~~i}~~~:
B - {(~n`.r`.rr~y'.....n1~y~~)~U~(.ri.y~) ~ C`~~ó~Jó).~rt ~ 0}
(~ - nlaxn~tllatr~-~.n~r~ ~~7~7~ zi 17~ !
{(- I l J..... l)~J ....,J .y E ~i~, rt 1 0}
13 is con~ex h~~ yuasi-concavity of I~ `. 1~o show thal C is convex, let (y', ... , y~~, ~~. rz) an~1
(j', ... ,,yr, y, ~n) constitute (uot be) memhers of C and let ~9 and ~J be posit-ive niunbcrs
surriining to onc. ~~4~ must Iind j~, ..., yi~, ï~ E Ii~, n~ 0 such that. - m~x n` max y`- rj -
-J max n.~ max p~ - i3y - ~) max ra` rnax r~` - Jy aud iaiy` - i9n~,y~ ~- ~9n`y`. Solution is y~ -
fl n~;~`~-iYn~il`. J- i7 maa n` max y~}~7 max n~` max y~ -max(~Jr~`y~}i7n~J~) fi7yf~9y, ~i~ - 1.
('lcarly y 1 0 since~ ~7 inxx ~ri` triaxy`' } i7 max it~ max y~ ~ Jre~'~~ ~ rJn~`y` Ior all t. This is
irue. Ht~nce C is coucex.
I3y cliib cf~i~-icn~~~~, tho inta~rv~.~~tion of tj and (' is ~~mpty. i3y t.iic se~~aratirig hyEicrE;lan~~
t heorem th~~re e~xist p, p~, ..., p~ noL all equal l~ zc~ro auc~h t hat
~Y~Y~,...,pT)I3 ~ (p,P', ..,pr)C.
In fact, sinre C is a conc.
~P,P',...,pi~)R 7 0? ~P,P',...,pr)C.
Hence, by strong monotonicity. of U~ : p; p' 1 0. Hence, by~ assumed positive endownienL,
~nopv~` 1 0. lience, thcre is a t with i~ó ~ 0 and pu' ~ 0. For this t an inte~rior
c~nsiirnption plan is feasiblc with respect to ~.r'-~p',y~ C 0. Hence, by strong monotonicity
and coutimiity of L". using a standard lrginrient-, ~~1 0 and this p` ~~ 0. Herice. b~~
nonzero andowment assumption, p~u~` 1 0 lor all l. By thc sauie argunieut, all p' 1~ 0. I
will no~k proce Lhat thcse prices are l,indahl.
i~irst thc contiumcr's condition. Suppose (~', 0, ..., 0, ,y~', 0, ..., 0) (with y` on local ion
1-~ G) fulfills U`(s`,~~) 1 U`(.x~,yo). In fa.ct, since pu~i ~ 0 a-rid ut,ility is strongly
monotonic and continuous, th~ same holds for a sligtit.ly srnaller vector. Using titrict
positivity of prices, it follows t.hat !3-member (.~`, 0, ..., 0, ~`, 0, ..., 0) fulfills y~` ~~`~~ ~
0. 1'his pro~~es that (.r~, y~) sol~~es the consumer's problem.
~ext, t,h~~ financial balance. By strong monotoniciky oF the 1.i"s, ~.here is no slack in
thc feasibility constraint of club eHicie~t (:~~~. ~~~~, n~)~-~,..,,~ :
~~rto.ró -- max ra~ max yó.
Hence, (- max n.ó rnax yo, rioy~, ..., n~~,yó ) belongs to the boundary of l3, usin~ strong
monotonicity and continuity of the U"s. It ~lso belongs to (..'. Since prir.es were showu
t~o se~~arate B and C at zero, the value is zero, yielding financial balancP.
L~tit ly ~ he problem of ~ hc public administra.tion. Any ot.her (- max n.~ max ~`, ra'y~, ...,
nzyT ) a,lso belongs to C and, therefc~re, is priced nonposit.ively, which is less tkian or e-
qual to zero. This proves tliat. (~~~,..., ~~~, rz~) solves the puhlic administration's problemnnd ~~uni~ili~t~~s tln~ ~iruu[uf iLe tlu~ur~~in.
Rcmarks.
I. In ~lu~ proof il ~~xs sho~an tlial all ~n'ic~es an~l [irs ara~ povitice.
'!. ('lub ~~Hici~~ncy itnplies thxt all in~li~'idual ~I~~niancls fcir puhlic goods are equ~~lized, if
t.he ulilil} func4ions are stri~~tly~ quasi-ecirica~-e.
3. '1'he ~inblic adniinistration breaks even.
}. II tiu, popiilalion ís uut re~ilicatPd, it~ -(1...., 1), I,he financial batance cun~lieiuu
o[ thi~ Lin~lahl o~~nilibrinnt ran bi~ sitn~ili(ir~l fiu'fkicr iuto ~~i'yu -T~J~- Hcn~~~. if only'
uni~ local public ~;oorl is supFilie~cl aud i~ is ilesi~;uated t.lte tiume.rair, Lhc~n tlie k~es siini lo
uoi~t.
a. "I'lu, ronvi~rsc i~ï tiu~ ~ii~~ori~iii is also Iru~-. :~ Lirdaól c~~!tilibri~un iti ~ li~b r~([icicnl. Thc
proof is casy: a st rai~hl,forwar~l a~lapta,tion of Si~hw~~iz~~r's ( 19~3) proof oE IiiS thi~orrni '?.
4 DiS~ussion
The Lli~~ori~m provides price supporL to allocal.ionti Llial cannot be iniprovc,d upon hy
cl~~b5. 'l'fie prices arc liuear, t~nlike :~las-Colell's (1980) Exrrsunalized Firice scLedules (als~~
u,ed bv Cille~s and Scot,chnu~r, f~irt,hcoming) or 13arh~im a.nd ~~~~'ood~~r's (]99:1) aduiission
f~~~,s or "wages.'' '1'he t,hcorein au~i i~,s proof a.re adaptations of Schweizer's ( 1983) thco-
rcm on club ~lfirient allocalions. 1[~, obta,ins th~~ Ilc~nry Gcorge "I'hcorc~m for c~~onomies
~~~itl~ fixcd piiblic goo~ls ~~nd associa,ted inpuLti and, if tlie lalter arc zero, I,lie welfare and
corc liniit thcorcros. In ihc prrsrnt papc,r, public ~;oods arc not cxogenous, bu1 endogc-
no~iv, uauiclv ~,Lc ou~conie uf i ouiprLiLiou atnung ut ilit.y nittxiuiizcrs. ~lor~~o~-cr, thcy' ari,
not~ p~n~i~, buL local. I ailniil. ~h~~L n~y ~~IcliniLion of local public gocids invol~~es a friirl~~
opporLunistic aggregation rul~~, bnt i.h~~re is lit~lc hopc for rnore gencral rusulLs.
r1fti,r all, it is well knoivn ~.hat. th~re is no compeLi~ia~~ basis for Lindahl ~quilibria
in pure~ public goods econotnics (A9illeron. 1972, and I3ewley~. L92i1). ~l'oodcrs (1978)
has cori,jecttu'i~d thaL t~he cor~ shrinks t~~hori there is crowcling, hiil ('onlr~- and ~~1'~ioders
(199.1) show th~i~. thc second we~lfan, theorein is fi~~~u,rally Calse. 13a,rli~ui ancl l~Vcio~lerti
(19~)-1) lirovides useful r~rl~~ionships bi~lwocn opt.iina and c~ompi~t,it~ive cquili}iria, I~iit a,ll
t lii~~c, papers concern economies wilh one pri~~aie and one publii' good only.
I~:qnall,y opportunisti~ in modi~llin~ an i~conomy with nuil~iplc public goods suc'h 1ha1
I-hc I,in~inhl cqiiiliLrium cinerges, is Vasil'cv, ~Neber, and Wicsmc~h (1996). Tl~al paper
iisc~ti an a.Iternaiivc~ ~urc~ d~~(iiiit~ion, with u~,ilítv Ic~cels of mrrnbers of blor,king coalitionsd~pa~n~ling on r~~plic~ sizo and coalition stru~ture.. :1ltkiough my approae~h to local pul~lic
~;oo~ls niat~ scem rl~~ani~r. I hxstrn tu sa~ that the t~~~o approarhes ar~, ossPntiallv ~~yuiw
alent. In e~ith~~r ~asi~, the opporinnity i~ost of inili~idtial tiuhlic good5 consuniption is
ind~~pend~nt of tlte size of the economy. Pr~ni tliis tx~rspective. uiy paper m~rkes but a
ntodest contribution by slio~cing titat S~'h~ceizer's theur~~m encompassc~s Vasil'ev's core
limit Ih~~orcm. :1 no~-clt}~ is tlu~ simplicity of thc~ anal~.sis. Cluh cflicicncy is quite a
powerful tool.
Tho price I pa~~ for t hi~ use of club officiency, i~ i he assumption tYtat. meutbership
numbers are real. '1'lte integer problem is ignored. Fcu large economies it is kno~~-n to
~iisappear and i~~-~~n sotn~, stnall rconotniev rnav have crowding or congestion technolo~ic~s
ihat "click~~ (see iha~ just r~~fi~rc~n~~c~d works of 5c'ot~hrner, Wooders, aud co-autliors). V~iil.
I remain sil~nt on the sizi~ uí i~lficirnt rlnbv, lia~iuh astiur,,:~ 1 ~~n~titant returus tu s~~ale.
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